

**Reanalyzing Agreement and Incorporation Restrictions in Southern Tiwa:
Interaction/Satisfaction meets Gluttony – Joseph Class, UCLA**

Introduction Southern Tiwa is characterized by rich verbal agreement. As seen in (1a), a single agreement portmanteau can spell out the person and number features of up to three arguments. Number agreement with 3rd person arguments is specifically indicated through ‘noun class’ markers labelled A B or C (Noyer 1992). In several instances, internal arguments also obligatorily undergo noun incorporation (1b).

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| <p>(1) a. Tow-wia-ban
 1SGSUB.C(3PLOBJ).A(3SGIO)-give-PAST
 ‘I gave them to him/her’</p> | <p>b. Ka-’u’u-wia-ban
 1SGSUB.A(3SGOBJ).2SGIO-baby-give-PAST
 ‘I gave the baby to you’</p> |
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Agreement is subject to two distinct versions of the *Person Case Constraint*, or PCC, both of which extend to noun incorporation. When transitive subjects – which I call *ergatives* – are 3rd person, they cannot c-command any lower argument that is 1st person, 2nd person, or non-incorporated (*3 > 1/2/non-incorporated). Applied or indirect objects – which I call *datives* – also cannot c-command a 1st person, 2nd person, or non-incorporated internal argument, *regardless of their person* (*1/2/3 > 1/2/non-incorporated) (Rosen 1990, Heck and Richards 2010). I call these the *Ergative Restriction* and the *Dative Restriction*, respectively. This pattern is not easily captured by nominal licensing-based accounts of the PCC (Anagnostopoulou 2003, Béjar and Rezac 2009). Under the assumption that 1st person, 2nd person, and non-incorporated nominals share some relevant feature that needs to be licensed, any nominal-licensing based account has to make the ad hoc stipulation that all datives, but *only* 3rd person ergatives, block this licensing relationship. Other accounts, such as Heck and Richards (2010), have instead attempted to derive the pattern by stipulating idiosyncratic rules that delete a probe in the context of certain nominals. As an alternative, I put forward a novel analysis that combines Deal’s (2015, 2021) *Interaction/Satisfaction* model of Agree and Coon and Keine’s (2021) *gluttony*-based account of PCC effects. I specifically propose that the restrictions discussed above arise from two distinct probes with different interaction and satisfaction conditions, both of which have an [EPP] feature that triggers phrasal movement. When these probes agree with more than one argument, a *gluttonous configuration* arises whereby two DPs must move at the same time, crashing the derivation (Coon and Keine 2021).

Background Assumptions I follow Heck and Richards (2010) in assuming that the relevant restrictions can be reanalyzed as restrictions on the distribution of DPs. Building off work from Adger and Harbour (2007) and Richards (2008), Heck and Richards specifically propose that all 1st and 2nd person arguments are DPs, and that all ergatives, datives, and non-incorporating internal arguments are DPs regardless of person. Internal arguments that incorporate, on the other hand, are bare NPs. In this way, the Ergative and Dative Restrictions can be reframed as the following.

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| <p>(2)
 Ergative Restriction
 (*3 > 1/2/non-incorp) = *3DP > DP</p> | <p>
 Dative Restriction
 (*1/2/3 > 1/2/non-incorp) = *DP > DP</p> |
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
Interaction/Satisfaction Meets Gluttony I propose that the restrictions in (2) result from two different probes located on little *v* and an inflectional head *Infl*. Little *v* introduces ergatives in its specifier, and c-commands both datives in [spec, Appl] and internal arguments. *Infl* selects for *vP* and c-commands little *v*. The basic clause structure is given below.

- (3) $[_{InflP} Infl [_{vP} DP_{Erg} v [_{AppIP} DP_{Dat} Appl [_{VP} DP/NP_{IntArg} V]]]]$


I follow Deal (2015, 2021) in assuming that these probes are separately specified for *interaction* and *satisfaction* conditions. *Infl* has a probe specified as [INT:D, SAT: PART], and little *v* has a

probe specified as [INT:D, SAT:Ø]. Both probes have the categorial feature D as their interaction condition, meaning that whenever they encounter a DP target they copy over the ϕ -features located on D. Infl’s probe has a *participant* feature [PART] as its satisfaction condition, and therefore stops probing whenever it encounters a 1st or 2nd person DP. Little v’s probe is *insatiable* – it has no satisfaction condition, meaning it interacts with all DPs in its c-command domain. Both probes are also specified with an [EPP] feature that triggers phrasal movement of any goal they interact with. Additionally, little v has a number probe specified as [INT:NUM, SAT:NUM]. This probes after [INT:D, SAT: Ø], and plays no role in deriving the relevant restrictions.

The Dative Restriction As stated in (2), a dative DP cannot c-command a lower DP, only a bare NP. In grammatical DP > NP configurations, the [INT:D, SAT:Ø] probe on little v probes first, agrees with a single dative DP in its c-command domain, and triggers a single instance of phrasal movement as a result of its [EPP] feature. For reasons discussed below, I assume that this movement involves “tucking-in” to a specifier position in vP lower than that of the ergative argument (Richards 1997). Phrasal movement eliminates the dative DP as an intervener for subsequent probing from little v. [INT:NUM, SAT:NUM] probes next, and agrees with the bare NP, which incorporates. In ungrammatical *DP > DP configurations, [INT:D, SAT:Ø] interacts with two distinct DPs, creating a *gluttonous configuration* (Coon and Keine 2021). This alone doesn’t result in ungrammaticality, but because [INT:D, SAT:Ø] has an [EPP] feature, agreeing with both DPs triggers simultaneous phrasal movement to [spec, vP]. This crashes the derivation because it is impossible to simultaneously move two distinct items into a specifier position within a derivational system that can only merge two items at once (Coon and Keine 2021).



The Ergative Restriction In contrast to datives, only 3rd person ergative DPs are prohibited from c-commanding any lower DP arguments. This is due to an [INT:D, SAT:PART] probe on Infl. By the time Infl has merged, an ergative DP has been introduced in the specifier of vP, and any lower arguments have either been tucked into a lower specifier of vP, or incorporated, both as a result of the probes on little v. [INT:D, SAT:PART] therefore finds the ergative DP first. If the ergative DP is 1st or 2nd person, [INT:D, SAT:PART] stops its search there, as its satisfaction condition is met by a [PART] feature. The [EPP] feature on the probe then triggers a single well-defined instance of phrasal movement. If the ergative DP is 3rd person, however, the probe continues its search, as its satisfaction condition hasn’t been met. If it encounters any lower DP, another gluttonous configuration is created, as the probe has now interacted with two distinct DPs. This likewise triggers simultaneous phrasal movement, crashing the derivation.



Moving Forward As far as I know, this analysis is the first of its kind to use Interaction/Satisfaction to derive gluttonous configurations that give rise to PCC-like effects. This shows that Interaction/Satisfaction can complement gluttony-based accounts of agreement restrictions, opening up new possibilities for reanalyzing PCC-type phenomena in other languages. **Selected References** Coon, J., and S. Keine. 2021. Feature Gluttony. *Linguistic Inquiry* || Deal, AR. 2015. Interaction and Satisfaction in Phi-Agreement. In *NELS 45*. || Heck, F., and M. Richards. 2010. A Probe-Goal Approach to Agreement and Non-Incorporation Restrictions in Southern Tiwa. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory*.