

PERSON: motivating a four-way distinction & binary features

Standard theories classify PERSON into three categories: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. Here, I argue that this classification is not fine-grained enough to capture all the PERSON distinctions attested in natural language. We actually need four categories of PERSON, not three. Furthermore, we need a bivalent, rather than a privative feature system. I will propose the following four-way distinction for PERSON resulting from a fully binary cross-classification on the features $[\pm Participant]$ and $[\pm Author]$: 1st-PERSON = $[+Participant, +Author]$; 2nd-PERSON = $[+Participant, -Author]$; 3rd-PERSON = $[-Participant, -Author]$; NULL-PERSON = \emptyset . Empirical support for this proposal comes from differing patterns of behavior in anaphors crosslinguistically.

A popular view (Reuland, 2001, 2011; Kratzer, 2009; Rooryck and vanden Wyngaerd, 2011, a.o.) is that ϕ -deficiency is the defining property of (nominal) anaphora. Empirical support for this comes from (i) the fact that anaphors crosslinguistically seem to fail to mark the full range of ϕ -distinctions in the given language (based on ϕ -restrictions placed on their antecedence), and (ii) the Anaphor Agreement Effect (the observation that anaphors cannot trigger covarying ϕ -agreement, see Rizzi, 1990; Woolford, 1999; Tucker, 2011; Sundaresan, 2016, a.o.): which would follow if the anaphor itself lacked ϕ -features. Theoretically, it draws support from the idea (Bouchard, 1984) that a nominal needs a full set of ϕ -features to be LF-interpretable, and that it is featurally economical. But the ϕ -feature deficiency account is beset by both theoretical and empirical challenges. The theoretical issue is that, while the ϕ -features of a nominal restrict its domain of reference (in the evaluation context), they crucially don't exhaust it: in Heim and Kratzer (1998), this intuition is captured by proposing that ϕ -features introduce presuppositions that restrict the reference of nominals: these are formally hardwired as partial functions into the lexical entries of the referring expressions themselves. Adger and Ramchand (2005); Hicks (2009) thus propose anaphors are unvalued for an ID feature, which directly targets reference. Empirically, three problems can be discerned. **I. Fully ϕ -specified anaphors:** In languages like San Lucas Quiavini Zapotec, even R-expressions may be anaphorically bound (Zapotec (1) Heinat, 2008, 151):

- (1) R-ralloh Gye'eihlly_i [_{CP} r-yu'lààa'z Lia Paamm Gye'eihlly_i].
 HAB-think Mike HAB-like F Pam Mike
 "Mike thinks [_{CP} Pam likes Mike_{i,*j}]." (literal)

vP ellipsis tests of such sentences yield obligatory sloppy readings, a diagnostic of bound-variable behavior, showing that (1) is not an instance of accidental coreference. Finally, such data also cannot be dismissed as representing a form of syncretism between R-expressions/pronouns, on the one hand, and anaphors, on the other (as e.g. Rooryck and vanden Wyngaerd, 2011, do with Brabant Dutch where the anaphoric form looks the same as the pronominal one). For a language like Zapotec, this would require copying not just ϕ -features but also some sort of lexical content to trigger the pronunciation of e.g. *Mike* vs. *Bill* in anaphoric position, yielding massive redundancy. **II. Special anaphoric agreement:** In e.g. the Bantu languages Swahili ((2a)-(2b) Woolford, 1999) and Chicheŵa (Baker, 2008), "special" agreement (i.e. differing from standard 1/2/3) is triggered under an anaphor:

- (2) (a) Ahmed a-na-m/*ji-penda Halima (b) Ahmed a-na-ji/*m-penda mwenyewe.
 Ahmed 3SBJ-PRS-3OBJ-love Halima. Ahmed 3SBJ-PRS-REFL/*3OBJ-love himself
 "Ahmed loves Halima." "Ahmed_i loves himself_i." (emphatic)

This suggests that such anaphors *are* featurally specified for PERSON – but for a different kind of feature from the standard (1st, 2nd, 3rd) categorization of PERSON (see also Chapter 4 in Baker, 2008, for discussion). **1/2 vs. 3:** Crosslinguistically, anaphors tend to disprefer 1st and 2nd-person antecedents. Many anaphors (German *sich*, Japanese *zibun*, Korean *caki*, Italian *se*, Dravidian *taan*) only allow 3rd-person antecedents. While there *are* anaphors (e.g. Chinese *ziji*) that allow 1st, 2nd person antecedents — they crucially *also* allow 3rd-PERSON antecedents. But: (4) No anaphor seems to allow a 1st/2nd-PERSON antecedent while simultaneously *disallowing* a 3rd-PERSON antecedent. Under a purely (1 vs. 2 vs. 3) ϕ -deficiency approach to anaphora, there is no elegant way to capture this person asymmetry.

Proposal: (i) There are four main categories for PERSON; (ii) we need a bivalent rather than privative feature system (i.e. a feature $[F] = \{[+F], [-F], \emptyset\}$; $[-F] = \neg[+F]$ but \emptyset = the absence of F) involving

[\pm Participant] and [\pm Author]. Adapting Halle (1997); Nevins (2007): [$+$ Author] = the reference set contains the speaker of the evaluation context (default: utterance-context); [$+$ Participant] = the reference set contains one of the participants of the evaluation context (default: utterance context). Cross-classifying the two features yields the following four-way distinction ([$-$ Participant, $+$ Author] doesn't exist because its extension is logically undefined): Within this classification, I propose there

CATEGORY	FEATURES	EXPONENTS
1st-PERSON	[$+$ Participant, $+$ Author]	I, we
2nd-PERSON	[$+$ Participant, $-$ Author]	you
3rd-PERSON	[$-$ Participant, $-$ Author]	he/she/it, sich, taan
NULL-PERSON	\emptyset	ziji, himself, yourself, myself

are two classes of anaphor. **Class I: Null anaphors:** Anaphors of this class are specified as NULL-PERSON. They begin their syntactic life-cycle with a fully unvalued set of ϕ -features (and are minimal pronouns in the sense of Kratzer, 2009). Anaphoric binding is the result of ϕ -valuation by Agree with a locally c-commanding T/v or a non-anaphoric DP. It automatically follows that these anaphors can allow antecedents of all PERSON: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. Example: Chinese *ziji*, English *herself*. **Class II: 3rd-PERSON anaphors:** Anaphors of this class are specified as 3rd-PERSON = [$-$ Participant, $-$ Author]. They are thus explicitly forbidden from being anteceded by [$+$ Participant] elements, deriving the ban on 1st and 2nd-PERSON antecedence (seen with German *sich*, Tamil *ta(a)n*, Romance *se* and many others). Such anaphors could then also trigger special “anaphoric” agreement of the kind seen with Swahili (cf. (2a) vs. (2)b). An important question is what featurally distinguishes 3rd-PERSON anaphors (e.g. *sich*) from 3rd-PERSON pronouns (e.g. *er/es/sie*): i.e. what makes a 3rd-PERSON anaphor formally “anaphoric”? Answer: 3rd-PERSON anaphors must be defined by their deficiency with respect to some *other* (i.e. non- ϕ) feature. As already mentioned, Adger and Ramchand (2005); Hicks (2009) argue that this is the ID-feature (which directly targets the referential index). And with at least some languages (e.g. Italian, Japanese, Icelandic, Dutch, Norwegian, Ewe, and Tamil), there is empirical evidence for the relevance of (spatio-temporal or mental) perspective for the regulation of anaphoric dependencies (Kuno, 1987; Sells, 1987; Hellan, 1988; Sigurðsson, 1991; Lødrup, 2007; Pearson, 2013, a.o.) and furthermore that this perspective is structurally represented (Koopman and Sportiche, 1989; Sundaresan, 2012; Nishigauchi, 2014; Charnavel, 2015), so such anaphors might be defined by having an unvalued perspectival feature. In contrast, while Class I (Null) anaphors may additionally lack other features as well — the lack of ϕ -features is their defining property.

Under this proposal, both Class I (Null) and Class II (3rd-PERSON) anaphors are well-behaved wrt. the generalization in (4). A Null-anaphor (e.g. Chinese *ziji*) which allows 1st- and 2nd person antecedents, will automatically *also* allow 3rd-PERSON antecedents, since it is featurally \emptyset . A 3rd-PERSON anaphor (e.g. German *sich*), featurally specified as [$-$ Participant, $-$ Author], would automatically *disallow* 1st- and 2nd-PERSON antecedents, and only allow 3rd. The only scenario that would allow 1st/2nd-antecedence while disallowing 3rd would be if the anaphor were itself specified [$+$ Participant]. But there is independent evidence that [$+$ Participant]-marked nominals cannot serve *solely* as anaphors — they would indexically *also* be able to denote participants of the utterance context. E.g. “fake indexicals” (von Stechow, 2002; Rullman, 2004; Kratzer, 2009; Déchaine and Wiltschko, 2010) necessarily also function as true indexicals: there aren't dedicated anaphoric forms for 1st/ 2nd-PERSON alone in any language, as far as I'm aware. For perspectival anaphors there is additional empirical support that these are *obviative* in that they *independently* cannot refer to the perspective of the utterance context participant (Hellan, 1988; Schlenker, 2003; Giorgi, 2006; Bylinina, 2014; Sigurðsson, 2010; Sundaresan, 2012). This suggests that the perspectival-feature with the [$+$ Participant] feature leads to semantic incompatibility or even a contradiction.

Potential further support comes from PCC Effects (see Adger and Harbour, 2007, for arguments re. two types of 3rd-person, similarly distinguished, based on Kiowa PCC data). An advantage of this approach, if correct, is that it may help resolve the long-standing debate (Benveniste, 1971) of whether 3rd-person is “real”. Under the four-way PERSON distinction argued for here, 3rd-PERSON (= [$-$ Participant, $-$ Author]) would count as a real PERSON, but NULL-PERSON (= \emptyset) would not.